Concessions require an obvious stopping point to avoid signaling collapse

Evidence

If one is about to make a concession, he needs to control his adversary’s expectations; he needs a recognizable limit to his own retreat. If one is to make a finite concession that is not to be interpreted as capitulation, he needs an obvious place to stop. A mediator’s suggestion may provide it; or any other element that qualitatively distinguishes the new position from surrounding positions. If one has been demanding 60 per cent and recedes to 50 per cent, he can get his heels in; if he recedes to 49 per cent, the other will assume that he has hit the skids and will keep sliding. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 179

Categorization

• XREF: The 60-to-50 versus 60-to-49 distinction is about credible-commitment signaling — the exact Schellingian machinery the reader pairs with Godfather-bonds. — connects to: Public pledges of reputation can make concessions impossible — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 81; In focal-point bargaining small concessions signal collapse and are rejected — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 266; Timely reforms welcomed become concessions interpreted as weakness under threat (+2 more)

Related

• In focal-point bargaining small concessions signal collapse and are rejected (similarity 0.86)
• Desperate mutual need makes even poor signals coordinate action (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• In focal-point bargaining small concessions signal collapse and are rejected #corroborates (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 266
• Timely reforms welcomed become concessions interpreted as weakness under threat #corroborates (0.88)
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187