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Protection terms depend on the relative power of customer and mafioso

Protection terms depend on the relative power of customer and mafioso

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Sep 20, 20262 min read

Protection terms depend on the relative power of customer and mafioso

Related

  • Protection is a commodity paid for even when never used. (similarity 0.87)
  • In protection markets reputation is the product itself, not the signal of it (similarity 0.84)
  • Client concentration and violent competition make mafia protection contracts fragile. (similarity 0.84)
  • Prior analysts conflate protected goods’ markets with the protection market itself. (similarity 0.83)
  • A mafioso’s word functions as a guarantor that settles debts below face value (similarity 0.82)
  • The victim role shifts as protected parties alternately lose their protectors (similarity 0.82)
  • Solving competition in protection markets ultimately requires a mafia-like enforcing superagency. (similarity 0.82)
  • Businessmen receiving protection either pay a cut or become partners (similarity 0.81)
  • Commerce requires liberty, contract security, trust, and justice (similarity 0.81)
  • Trust reduces transaction costs the way lubricant reduces friction (similarity 0.80)
  • Mafia protection customers range from spot buyers to kin (similarity 0.80)
  • Law exists to reduce the severity of trust-violation losses (similarity 0.80)
  • Contract terms depend on the relative bargaining power of customer and mafioso (similarity 0.80)
  • Potential to sanction breaches is the strongest basis for trusting another. (similarity 0.79)
  • Trust and trustworthiness are asymmetrical because only trusting carries significant risk of exploitation (similarity 0.79)

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  • Protection terms depend on the relative power of customer and mafioso
  • Related

Backlinks

  • A mafioso's word functions as a guarantor that settles debts below face value
  • Businessmen receiving protection either pay a cut or become partners
  • Client concentration and violent competition make mafia protection contracts fragile.
  • In protection markets reputation is the product itself, not the signal of it
  • Prior analysts conflate protected goods' markets with the protection market itself.
  • Protection challengers raise switching costs rather than undercutting prices
  • Protection is a commodity paid for even when never used.
  • Solving competition in protection markets ultimately requires a mafia-like enforcing superagency.
  • The victim role shifts as protected parties alternately lose their protectors