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Law exists to reduce the severity of trust-violation losses

Law exists to reduce the severity of trust-violation losses

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Sep 20, 20261 min read

Law exists to reduce the severity of trust-violation losses

Related

  • Trust reduces transaction costs the way lubricant reduces friction (similarity 0.87)
  • Deceitful trust, once established, obliges its user into genuine trustworthiness (similarity 0.86)
  • Trust is merely evidence-based expectation while trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.86)
  • Trust and trustworthiness are asymmetrical because only trusting carries significant risk of exploitation (similarity 0.86)
  • Potential to sanction breaches is the strongest basis for trusting another. (similarity 0.86)
  • Trust is inductively corrigible by objective experience (similarity 0.85)
  • Trusting values depend crucially on the information each party holds (similarity 0.85)
  • Trust grows out of the specific relationship between the parties (similarity 0.84)
  • System trust is easier to acquire but harder to control than personal trust (similarity 0.84)
  • Parasitic cheating thrives where trust is generalized from trustworthy settings (similarity 0.84)
  • Trust necessarily stays moored in expectations and interests (similarity 0.84)
  • Trust cannot be paired with obligation as promises are (similarity 0.84)
  • Moral characters of trustworthiness can make people trust even against reason. (similarity 0.83)
  • Trust relationships must be built gradually through small steps because of environmental contingency. (similarity 0.83)
  • Luhmann aimed his trust theory at empirical application (similarity 0.83)

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  • Law exists to reduce the severity of trust-violation losses
  • Related

Backlinks

  • Least religious nations rank highest in rule of law and trust
  • Parasitic cheating thrives where trust is generalized from trustworthy settings
  • Potential to sanction breaches is the strongest basis for trusting another.
  • Protection terms depend on the relative power of customer and mafioso
  • Reputation can substitute for legal enforceability in evaluating contracts.
  • Sudden escalation of stakes can transform iterated trust into one-shot opportunism
  • The victim role shifts as protected parties alternately lose their protectors
  • Trust and trustworthiness are asymmetrical because only trusting carries significant risk of exploitation
  • Trust reduces transaction costs the way lubricant reduces friction
  • Wilful effort is required to produce the appearance of subjectless violence.