Client concentration and violent competition make mafia protection contracts fragile.
Related
- Solving competition in protection markets ultimately requires a mafia-like enforcing superagency. (similarity 0.84)
- Protection terms depend on the relative power of customer and mafioso (similarity 0.84)
- Client dependence on a single protection firm creates fragility (similarity 0.83)
- Contractors join the mafia mainly out of a belief it is inevitable (similarity 0.83)
- Mafia protection customers range from spot buyers to kin (similarity 0.83)
- Mafia families punish members who poach fellow members’ clients. (similarity 0.83)
- Mafia violence exceeds what rational enforcement economics would require (similarity 0.83)
- Mafia protection is often genuinely sought after by customers, not merely imposed (similarity 0.82)
- State weakness cannot explain the mafia’s emergence (similarity 0.81)
- Illegality prevents mafia reputation from detaching from particular owners, blocking firm expansion (similarity 0.81)
- Contract terms depend on the relative bargaining power of customer and mafioso (similarity 0.81)
- The mafia first appears in official records as an established force (similarity 0.80)
- Mafia protection is a demanded commodity substituting for trust (similarity 0.80)
- Entry into the mafia requires inherited skills or psychopathy plus no better options (similarity 0.80)
- Mafia protection treats crime as disputes, not offenses (similarity 0.79)