In protection markets reputation is the product itself, not the signal of it

Related

• Prior analysts conflate protected goods’ markets with the protection market itself. (similarity 0.87)
• Protection is a commodity paid for even when never used. (similarity 0.85)
• Protection terms depend on the relative power of customer and mafioso (similarity 0.84)
• In protection markets reputation substitutes for actual service delivery. (similarity 0.82)
• Trust reduces transaction costs the way lubricant reduces friction (similarity 0.82)
• Trust and trustworthiness are asymmetrical because only trusting carries significant risk of exploitation (similarity 0.81)
• Trust is merely evidence-based expectation while trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.81)
• Solving competition in protection markets ultimately requires a mafia-like enforcing superagency. (similarity 0.80)
• Commerce requires liberty, contract security, trust, and justice (similarity 0.80)
• Smith saw market interdependence as replacing fragile trust with self-reinforcing mutual interest. (similarity 0.80)
• All illicit markets share the defining trait of being both unprotected and legally actionable. (similarity 0.79)
• Trusting values depend crucially on the information each party holds (similarity 0.79)
• Deceitful trust, once established, obliges its user into genuine trustworthiness (similarity 0.79)
• Parasitic cheating thrives where trust is generalized from trustworthy settings (similarity 0.79)
• Trust necessarily stays moored in expectations and interests (similarity 0.79)