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Potential to sanction breaches is the strongest basis for trusting another.

Potential to sanction breaches is the strongest basis for trusting another.

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Sep 20, 20261 min read

Potential to sanction breaches is the strongest basis for trusting another.

Related

  • Deceitful trust, once established, obliges its user into genuine trustworthiness (similarity 0.86)
  • Parasitic cheating thrives where trust is generalized from trustworthy settings (similarity 0.86)
  • Law exists to reduce the severity of trust-violation losses (similarity 0.86)
  • Trust is merely evidence-based expectation while trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.85)
  • Trust and trustworthiness are asymmetrical because only trusting carries significant risk of exploitation (similarity 0.85)
  • Moral characters of trustworthiness can make people trust even against reason. (similarity 0.85)
  • Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy (similarity 0.84)
  • Trust cannot be paired with obligation as promises are (similarity 0.84)
  • Trust reduces transaction costs the way lubricant reduces friction (similarity 0.84)
  • Trust grows out of the specific relationship between the parties (similarity 0.84)
  • Trust necessarily stays moored in expectations and interests (similarity 0.84)
  • Trusting values depend crucially on the information each party holds (similarity 0.83)
  • Distrust is self-reinforcing because it starves itself of corrective information (similarity 0.83)
  • Trust is inductively corrigible by objective experience (similarity 0.82)
  • Dominant powers benefit from engineering their subjects’ inability to trust (similarity 0.82)

✉️
  • Potential to sanction breaches is the strongest basis for trusting another.
  • Related

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  • Failed trust is answered with still more trust, not less.
  • In simple societies distrust is itself punished as a breach of law.
  • Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy
  • Law exists to reduce the severity of trust-violation losses
  • Moral characters of trustworthiness can make people trust even against reason.
  • Parasitic cheating thrives where trust is generalized from trustworthy settings
  • Paying judgments signals reliability even more strongly than avoiding disputes.
  • Protection terms depend on the relative power of customer and mafioso
  • Repeated future encounters make trust breach structurally costly
  • Trust and trustworthiness are asymmetrical because only trusting carries significant risk of exploitation