Pre-Challe French tactics wasted vast firepower while letting the A.L.N. slip away intact

Evidence

“One could no longer move,” stated one of Mohand Ou El-Hadj’s lieutenants: … One no longer ate. I was so weak that I could no longer even manage to carry my sub-machine-gun. The establishment of military posts, the multiplying of self-defence communities and intelligence agents was making life impossible, and even survival itself…. It was only by executing traitors one after the other that we did manage to survive. But one was never able to regain the initiative. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1015 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Algeria was divided into no less than seventy-five separate sectors—which meant there were “seventy-five ways of making war”—and offensive operations tended to be carried out haphazardly, without any co-ordinated plan. “Mounted several days in advance,” noted Challe, “they often struck nothing but emptiness.” The blows were too ponderous: — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1003 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Wilaya 4 pioneered forms of revolutionary warfare that worried the French command; The A.L.N. reached peak military strength in 1958 despite heavy losses; By 1960 French operations had destroyed most regular A.L.N. katibas inside Algeria (+12 more)

Broader Connections