French regroupment policy severed the FLN from village support

Evidence

On the other side the conclusions drawn were that Agounennda was the kind of engagement the A.L.N. could only lose, and lose heavily, and that henceforth it must be avoided at all costs. The success of the Soustelle—Lacoste S.A.S. system in the villages (there were now nearly 600 S.A.S. administrators scattered across Algeria) and of the harsh regroupment policy also meant that the Wilayas were finding it increasingly difficult to obtain succour from the local populations for their military operations. Instead of relying on the mechtas and douars for supply depots and refuges, they were forced to use the caves that riddle the calcareous mountains of Algeria like the holes in a Gruyère cheese. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 791

Categorization

  • XREF: Regroupment/resettlement echoes in later colonial counterinsurgency doctrine and in the broader literature on population-centric warfare. — connects to: French mass arrests replenished the F.L.N. ranks they meant to deplete — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 331; Pre-Challe French tactics wasted vast firepower while letting the A.L.N. slip away intact; French punitive failures drove uncommitted Auresians to join the F.L.N.

Broader Connections