The A.L.N. appeared statistically defeated by early 1960

Evidence

On the balance sheet, Challe’s own forces had suffered losses rarely exceeding a ratio of one to ten, a few hundred killed; while on his departure he reckoned that over half the regular katibas of the interior had been destroyed in the course of the past year’s offensives. The proportion of prisoners to killed had, significantly, risen to forty-two per cent from twenty-seven for the previous year, and a number of those who gave themselves up switched allegiances to join the harkis. In arms, the French claimed to have collected five for every one lost to the rebels (also a significant change from the early months of the war; the A.L.N. were losing 300 weapons net per month, and it was estimated that by September 1959 their logistic potential had sunk more than twenty per cent over the past year). Thus, statistically, the A.L.N. looked defeated by the time of Challe’s departure in 1960. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1019

Categorization

• QUESTION: If the A.L.N. was militarily on the ropes, what external/political factors prevented this from translating into French victory?
• XREF: connects to: The A.L.N. reached peak military strength in 1958 despite heavy losses; French military pressure by 1958 drove A.L.N. morale collapse and mass defection; By 1960 French operations had destroyed most regular A.L.N. katibas inside Algeria (+7 more)

Related

• By 1960 French operations had destroyed most regular A.L.N. katibas inside Algeria (similarity 0.94)
• French operations had reduced the interior A.L.N. to 8,000 scattered men (similarity 0.89)
• French military pressure by 1958 drove A.L.N. morale collapse and mass defection (similarity 0.87)
• The A.L.N. reached peak military strength in 1958 despite heavy losses (similarity 0.87)
• The A.L.N. peaked in 1958 even as French killed or captured 25,534 effectives. (similarity 0.84)
• Pre-Challe French tactics wasted vast firepower while letting the A.L.N. slip away intact (similarity 0.84)
• Political crisis in Algiers interrupted Challe’s offensive just as the A.L.N. neared collapse (similarity 0.84)
• Challe’s net starved the A.L.N. into losing the operational initiative (similarity 0.83)
• Defeat in Algiers pushed the F.L.N. leadership toward internal collapse. (similarity 0.83)
• French offensives shattered the F.L.N.’s interior command-and-control network by 1959 (similarity 0.82)
• Abstention in 1960 Algerian elections evidenced F.L.N. control over the population. (similarity 0.81)
• Challe aimed to disrupt rather than annihilate the F.L.N. (similarity 0.80)
• Challe’s military victories proved hollow because Boumedienne was rebuilding rebel strength abroad (similarity 0.80)
• F.L.N. leadership regrouped in Tunis after losing Algiers to the French. (similarity 0.80)
• French forces reached 160,000 and intelligence on the F.L.N. improved late in 1955 (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Political crisis in Algiers interrupted Challe’s offensive just as the A.L.N. neared collapse #qualifies (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1159
• French operations had reduced the interior A.L.N. to 8,000 scattered men #corroborates (0.65) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1160
• Abstention in 1960 Algerian elections evidenced F.L.N. control over the population. #complicates (0.40)