By 1960 French operations had destroyed most regular A.L.N. katibas inside Algeria

Evidence

At the moment of his departure the balance sheet claimed that 26,600 rebels had been “knocked out”, 11,000 captured, and nearly 21,000 arms recovered in that period, while Boumedienne’s 10,000 strong “army of the exterior” showed every sign of being—at least temporarily—neutralised. The A.L.N. of the “interior” could no longer muster more than 8,000 men, in scattered and generally demoralised groups. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1160 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

On the balance sheet, Challe’s own forces had suffered losses rarely exceeding a ratio of one to ten, a few hundred killed; while on his departure he reckoned that over half the regular katibas of the interior had been destroyed in the course of the past year’s offensives. The proportion of prisoners to killed had, significantly, risen to forty-two per cent from twenty-seven for the previous year, and a number of those who gave themselves up switched allegiances to join the harkis. In arms, the French claimed to have collected five for every one lost to the rebels (also a significant change from the early months of the war; the A.L.N. were losing 300 weapons net per month, and it was estimated that by September 1959 their logistic potential had sunk more than twenty per cent over the past year). Thus, statistically, the A.L.N. looked defeated by the time of Challe’s departure in 1960. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1019 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

“One could no longer move,” stated one of Mohand Ou El-Hadj’s lieutenants: … One no longer ate. I was so weak that I could no longer even manage to carry my sub-machine-gun. The establishment of military posts, the multiplying of self-defence communities and intelligence agents was making life impossible, and even survival itself…. It was only by executing traitors one after the other that we did manage to survive. But one was never able to regain the initiative. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1015 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The A.L.N. reached peak military strength in 1958 despite heavy losses; Challe’s net starved the A.L.N. into losing the operational initiative; French military pressure by 1958 drove A.L.N. morale collapse and mass defection (+6 more)

Related

• The A.L.N. appeared statistically defeated by early 1960 (similarity 0.94)
• French operations had reduced the interior A.L.N. to 8,000 scattered men (similarity 0.93)
• French military pressure by 1958 drove A.L.N. morale collapse and mass defection (similarity 0.92)
• Pre-Challe French tactics wasted vast firepower while letting the A.L.N. slip away intact (similarity 0.91)
• The A.L.N. reached peak military strength in 1958 despite heavy losses (similarity 0.91)
• Challe’s net starved the A.L.N. into losing the operational initiative (similarity 0.90)
• French offensives shattered the F.L.N.’s interior command-and-control network by 1959 (similarity 0.86)
• The Challe Plan’s pressure drove the A.L.N. near starvation and defensive paranoia. (similarity 0.86)
• Challe’s military victories proved hollow because Boumedienne was rebuilding rebel strength abroad (similarity 0.85)
• The A.L.N. peaked in 1958 even as French killed or captured 25,534 effectives. (similarity 0.85)
• Political crisis in Algiers interrupted Challe’s offensive just as the A.L.N. neared collapse (similarity 0.84)
• Challe’s military victory was illusory because guerrilla forces could regenerate. (similarity 0.84)
• French forces reached 160,000 and intelligence on the F.L.N. improved late in 1955 (similarity 0.83)
• Boumedienne’s retreat to Tunisian sanctuary deceived France about Challe Plan success (similarity 0.83)
• Defeat in Algiers pushed the F.L.N. leadership toward internal collapse. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• French operations had reduced the interior A.L.N. to 8,000 scattered men #corroborates (0.80) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1160
• The A.L.N. appeared statistically defeated by early 1960 #corroborates (0.75) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1019
• The Challe Plan’s pressure drove the A.L.N. near starvation and defensive paranoia. #expands (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1015
• Pre-Challe French tactics wasted vast firepower while letting the A.L.N. slip away intact #complicates (0.60)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria #complicates (0.50)
• French army sweeping operations drove Algerians into the F.L.N. #complicates (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 348