Politically dominant groups knowingly design more insulated institutions.

Evidence

Our analysis of Constitutional choice with an imperfect veil of ignorance of section 5, shows that if a group which is not behind a veil of ignorance, knows that the chosen policies will be in its favor (for instance because it is politically dominant), then it will choose more insulated systems. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 162

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Rawls’s veil of ignorance as a device for impartial constitutional choice, and to the idea that constitutional rules are written by those who expect to win under them. — connects to: Scholars have documented many functional strategies to insulate policies — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 190
• SEED: Angle: ‘The constitution is written by the people who expect to win’ — how procedural insulation (central bank independence, judicial review, supermajorities) tracks who wrote the rules.