Agency design that empowers allied interest groups entrenches policy by mobilizing their future influence.

Evidence

Decisions about administrative agency design can also entrench policy by setting into motion the type of policy-mobilization cycle described earlier. As Jonathan Macey argues, the design of administrative agencies can “perpetuate the power and legitimacy of certain [interest] groups and undermine the power and legitimacy of others.” Interest groups empowered by a particular agency design will, of course, be the groups most likely to influence agency decision making in the future. So, legislatures can entrench their policy preferences by designing agencies in ways that empower the interest groups that share the preferences of the enacting legislature. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 356

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Entrenchment mechanisms work through groups with aligned preservation interests — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 471; Some policies are self-consciously designed to entrench themselves and their creators.; Trust rests on the truster’s power to sanction breach through future influence — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 172

Broader Connections

• Some policies are self-consciously designed to entrench themselves and their creators. #expands (0.85)
• Trust rests on the truster’s power to sanction breach through future influence #corroborates (0.75) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 172