Constitutional design varies in how insulated policymakers are from ex post control

Evidence

We focus on a very general feature of political institutions and we label it the degree of ”insulation” of policymakers. An insulated leader2, once appointed, can rule with little or no ex post control. A non insulated one, instead, has to form large majorities to pass legislation and many groups may have veto power ex post. Alternatively, one can view this question as the determination of the (super)majority needed to pass legislation. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 15

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the paper’s central analytic variable: insulation of policymakers, operationalized as the (super)majority required to legislate.
• XREF: Maps onto veto-player theory (Tsebelis) and supermajority requirements in constitutional design. — connects to: Electoral and legislative entrenchment form one larger insulating phenomenon — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 41