Dictator-game choices reflect competing theories of rights, not selfishness.

Evidence

The dictator takes into account in a precise manner the rights both players may have over the money. In standard dictator games, however, there is no single clear basis for attributing rights over the money to one or the other player, and this may explain the variability of dictators’ decisions: Some consider they should give nothing, others consider they should give some money, and yet others consider they should split equally (Hagen & Hammerstein 2006; for a similar point, see Heintz 2005). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 123

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Baumard et al.’s partner-choice theory the reader is using: rights-attribution rather than pure self-interest explains egalitarian vs. selfish splits. — connects to: Dictators respect others’ earned property but not windfall money. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 118; Perceived ownership rights, not raw fairness, determine ultimatum-game rejection rates. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 130; Dictator-game production phases can isolate which contribution factors people reward — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 154 (+1 more)
• QUESTION: If the fumi-e ritual destroys the moral/rights framework, does it work precisely because it replaces one rights-attribution basis with another (authority-based trampling)?
• SHARE: The observation that ‘possession is commonly considered evidence of ownership’ in absence of contrary evidence is a compact point worth sending to a behavioral-economics colleague.

Related

• Dictators respect others’ earned property but not windfall money. (similarity 0.86)
• Fairness in economic games tracks perceived entitlement rather than raw contribution. (similarity 0.85)
• Dictators invoke entitlement to justify keeping shared stakes for themselves. (similarity 0.85)
• Perceived ownership rights, not raw fairness, determine ultimatum-game rejection rates. (similarity 0.83)
• Earned entitlements and game framing change how much people share. (similarity 0.83)
• Fairness judgments track each participant’s earned contribution, not just payoff equality. (similarity 0.80)
• Earning money dramatically reduces dictators’ willingness to share it. (similarity 0.79)
• Dictators share money only to the extent recipients’ earned it, not to help them. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Perceived ownership rights, not raw fairness, determine ultimatum-game rejection rates. #corroborates (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 130
• Dictator-game production phases can isolate which contribution factors people reward #expands (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 154
• Human morality is contingent rather than invariant across circumstances. #qualifies (0.72) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 390