Perceived group responsibility for inequity produces collective guilt

Evidence

A personal transgression is the prototypical guilt-arousing situation, and occurs when one thinks about or actually inflicts harm upon another. At the individual level, personal guilt results when a person accepts personal responsibility for an action or inaction that results in the suffering of another (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1998; Hoffman, 1994) – especially when the act is thought to be controllable or avoidable (Hoffman, 1983). Applying this idea to the collective level, if one perceives that one’s group is responsible for group-based inequity, feelings of collective guilt may arise (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 441

In summary, collective guilt arises from various circumstances. A group member does not need to accept personal responsibility for group-based inequity in order to feel collective guilt; however, when the member perceives more ingroup responsibility and a lack of justifiability for the inequity, feelings of collective guilt increase (Branscombe et al., 2002; Mallett & Swim, 2004). One might also feel collective guilt if one’s group commits a justice violation (Mallett & Swim, 2004). This might be the case if Whites recognize the role they play in altering the value of Black inputs, which would systematically decrease Black outputs. If recognized, maintaining an unfair group-based advantage such as this should remind Whites that a justice violation is occurring – a reminder that should result in feelings of distress. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 449

We suggest that the primary conceptual distinction between the acceptance and assignment of collective guilt based on group membership is focal. When the ingroup’s harmful actions toward another group are the focus, acceptance should be more likely, and when the outgroup’s harmful actions toward the ingroup are the focus, assignment should be more likely. We expected that the tendency to accept or assign collective guilt would depend greatly on the historical status of the groups – whether the group focused on was the perpetrator or victim of the moral violation. Members of victim groups should be more inclined to assign collective guilt to the perpetrator group, whereas members of perpetrator groups should be more willing to accept collective guilt when the injustice of the historical relationship is salient. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 152

In Chapter 3, Lickel et al. suggest that collective guilt can be experienced when a person witnesses another ingroup member committing harmful acts against members of an outgroup. Such guilt is most likely to occur when the perceiver shares some form of interdependence with the harm doer and might, therefore, have been able to prevent the harm doing. In contrast, collective shame is thought to occur when the harmful outcome implies something stable and unchangeable about the ingroup. For these investigators, guilt depends on the perceiver having some degree of personal responsibility for the outcome, whereas shame depends on there being implications for the nature of the ingroup as a whole. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 94

As described, individuals tend to feel guilty for their own wrongdoings when they believe that they should have been able to control their behavior or do something to prevent a negative event from occurring. Given this behavioral focus that is typical of guilt, feelings of collective guilt that people have for the actions of their ingroup should also stem from an interpretation that they had some kind of behavioral control over the blameworthy event – either control over the onset of the original actions that caused the event or control over the continuing repercussions of the event. In the former case, people might feel a sense of collective guilt if they believe that they might have had influence over the behavior of other ingroup members who directly caused the negative event. Furthermore, the nature of this influence could either be that they indirectly encouraged or facilitated the actions of their fellow group members or that they failed to prevent their actions. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 315

Categorization

• XREF: The controllability/avoidability condition on guilt parallels the reader’s interest: what a glorifier vs. attacher perceives as avoidable may gate whether guilt arises. — connects to: Collective guilt is felt when the self’s group illegitimately harmed another group — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 0; Perceived group inequity motivates distress that drives restorative action — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 431; Acknowledging group privilege triggers collective rather than individual guilt — Janet K. Swim and Deborah L. Miller, White Guilt: Its Antecedents and…, 25 (+18 more)
• DEFINE: Specifies the defining conditions under which acceptance vs. assignment of collective guilt is expected, the conceptual backbone the reader wants.
• corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 441; Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 449; Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 152 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Collective emotions like group anger and guilt arise from ingroup appraisals #corroborates (0.90) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 2264
• Social identity variables affect collective guilt only through perceived responsibility, legitimacy, and justice costs #corroborates (0.88) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 116
• Collective guilt requires admitting in-group responsibility and spurs reparations #expands (0.85) — Emanuele Castano, On the Perils of Glorifying the In-group, 65
• Perceiving a group’s wrongdoing as situationally justifiable blocks collective guilt #corroborates (0.82) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 297
• Guilt requires self-categorizing as a group member #qualifies (0.80) — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 20
• Perceived justification of ingroup harm blocks collective guilt regardless of harm severity #qualifies (0.78) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 156
• Affective group attachment, not mere membership perception, drives non-linear responses to collective guilt #qualifies (0.75) — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 26