Guilt requires perceived control while shame arises from uncontrollable exposure

Evidence

We do see controllability of the outcome as one of the most critical factors that differentiates between guilt and shame. People feel guilty primarily for actions or inactions that they controlled and accept responsibility for (McGraw, 1987). In contrast, people primarily feel shame for outcomes that they could not, or were not in control of, but that when publicly revealed portrays them as weak or inferior (see Smith et al., 2002). — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 219

People feel guilty primarily for actions or inactions that they controlled and accept responsibility for (McGraw, 1987). In contrast, people primarily feel shame for outcomes that they could not, or were not in control of, but that when publicly revealed portrays them as weak or inferior (see Smith et al., 2002). Furthermore, shame-inducing events do not necessarily involve any harm doing to others at all; people primarily feel shame for events that involve harm to the self’s reputation or perceived competence. In contrast, the more that people feel that they personally could have actually exerted some control in preventing the perpetrators’ harmful actions, the more likely they are to feel guilt, and such perceived control should be greater the more the perceiver is interdependently linked with the perpetrators (see Chapter 3, this volume, by Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau). — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 220

We do see controllability of the outcome as one of the most critical factors that differentiates between guilt and shame. … Furthermore, shame-inducing events do not necessarily involve any harm doing to others at all; people primarily feel shame for events that involve harm to the self’s reputation or perceived competence. In contrast, the more that people feel that they personally could have actually exerted some control in preventing the perpetrators’ harmful actions, the more likely they are to feel guilt, and such perceived control should be greater the more the perceiver is interdependently linked with the perpetrators (see Chapter 3, this volume, by Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau). — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 219

Categorization

• DEFINE: Core definitional contrast: guilt is control- and responsibility-based on harm doing; shame is loss of stature or competence, with no necessary harm to others.
• XREF: Links the guilt-vs-shame control mechanism to the interdependence/self-perception claim from Chapter 3 (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau). — connects to: Public shaming campaigns may backfire by evoking shame instead of guilt — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 371; Naming-and-shaming policy fails when shame breeds no guilt or reparation — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 2081; Guilt targets specific acts while shame taints the entire self — Emanuele Castano, On the Perils of Glorifying the…, 64 (+7 more)
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 219; Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 220

Broader Connections

• Guilt targets specific acts while shame taints the entire self #expands (0.80) — Emanuele Castano, On the Perils of Glorifying the In-group, 64
• Guilt is deeply unpleasant because it threatens one’s self-image as good #contradicts (0.70) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 1815