Outbidding’s impact on peace accords depends on pro-accord blocs’ capacity to withstand internal pressure.

Evidence

As the continuum of intra-ethnic group outbidding aims suggests, outbidding can have a variety of impacts on a peacemaking process or the implementation of a peace accord. The extent of impacts depends not only on capacity and strategies of outbidders, but the ability of the pro-peace process or accord constituency to withstand pressure from within their respective blocs. In turn, this may depend on the symmetry or asymmetry of intragroup sub-units (Richmond, 1998, p. 709), the degree to which a party relies on a coalition for support or the extent to which external actors may be engaged in peace-support activities. For ethnic outbidding contests to be effective, ethnicity must matter in the society and parties must be organized along ethnic lines (Horowitz, 1985, p. 291). — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 63

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s theoretical question about whether outbidding dynamics differ by regime type and identity axis — this analytic framework of impact severity is the dependent-variable machinery for the DUP vs. Kenya/Zambia comparison. — connects to: Outbidding impacts on peace accords form a graded spectrum from collapse to symbolic modification. — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 64; Credibility disputes over rivals’ bids shape outbidding outcomes. — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 36

Related

• Outbidding impacts on peace accords form a graded spectrum from collapse to symbolic modification. (similarity 0.91)
• Ethnic outbidding intensity fluctuates over a peace process’s timeline, not continuously (similarity 0.87)
• Outbidding aims range from accord collapse to full acceptance (similarity 0.84)
• Ethnic outbidding is intra-bloc competition that blocks inter-group compromise. (similarity 0.84)
• Outbidding is context dependent and can phase-shift toward moderation after in-group victory (similarity 0.84)
• Outbidders may damage a peace process only as a byproduct of attacking intragroup rivals. (similarity 0.82)
• Ethnic outbidding can be modulated and coexist with party modernization (similarity 0.80)
• Outbidding can backfire by strengthening moderates or branding challengers as spoilers (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Credibility disputes over rivals’ bids shape outbidding outcomes. #complicates (0.75) — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 36