Outbidding impacts on peace accords form a graded spectrum from collapse to symbolic modification.

Evidence

The range of outbidding impacts stretches from outright collapse of the process or accord to unsubstantial (perhaps symbolic) modifications to the process. Serious impacts short of a complete collapse may include the destabilization of a process to the extent that peace negotiations must be placed on hold or the sensitisation of a particular issue to the extent that a party is forced to declare that no concessions can be made on that issue. Less serious impacts will mean that the process or accord maintains largely its original purpose but may have to undergo modification. The least serious impacts may simply be that the attention of peace process participants is drawn to a previously overlooked issue, for example provision for the victims of violence in any peace accord. — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 64

Categorization

• XREF: Useful graded typology for operationalizing outbidding consequences when comparing DUP behavior under pluralist democracy against the regime cases; gives a dependent-variable ladder for ‘how much damage did outbidding do’. — connects to: Outbidding aims range from accord collapse to full acceptance — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 26; Ethnic outbidding intensity fluctuates over a peace process’s timeline, not continuously — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 45; Outbidding’s impact on peace accords depends on pro-accord blocs’ capacity to withstand internal pressure. — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 63

Related

• Outbidding aims range from accord collapse to full acceptance (similarity 0.92)
• Outbidding’s impact on peace accords depends on pro-accord blocs’ capacity to withstand internal pressure. (similarity 0.91)
• Ethnic outbidding intensity fluctuates over a peace process’s timeline, not continuously (similarity 0.87)
• Outbidders may damage a peace process only as a byproduct of attacking intragroup rivals. (similarity 0.81)
• Outbidding can backfire by strengthening moderates or branding challengers as spoilers (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Outbidding’s impact on peace accords depends on pro-accord blocs’ capacity to withstand internal pressure. #expands (0.85) — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 63