Outbidders may damage a peace process only as a byproduct of attacking intragroup rivals.

Evidence

Importantly, political actors engaged in outbidding may regard influencing the peace process as a secondary aim. In such cases a civil war may be largely contained in one part of the state or may occupy the attentions of few but the governing party. Outbidders may have no serious interest in the peace process and may simply identify the government’s handling of it as an issue upon which they can exercise leverage over intragroup rivals. Thus negative impacts on the peace process may merely be collateral to the core aim of embarrassing a rival party. — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 31

Categorization

• XREF: Complicates the reader’s outbidding-against-democratic-regime comparison: here outbidding’s primary target is intra-ethnic rivals, not the regime. Directly relevant to weighing Northern Ireland against Kenya/Zambia along ‘target of mobilization’ rather than regime type alone. — connects to: Threat can redirect hostility toward unrelated weaker outgroups — Walter G. Stephan, Oscar Ybarra, Kimberly Rios Morrison, Intergroup Threat Theory, 20; Outbidders weaponize fear narratives while discounting deferred peace benefits. — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 32; Aggressors with impunity lack incentive to accept peace plans — Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and…, 597 (+2 more)

Related

• Outbidding can backfire by strengthening moderates or branding challengers as spoilers (similarity 0.85)
• Ethnic outbidding intensity fluctuates over a peace process’s timeline, not continuously (similarity 0.83)
• Outbidders weaponize fear narratives while discounting deferred peace benefits. (similarity 0.82)
• Outbidding’s impact on peace accords depends on pro-accord blocs’ capacity to withstand internal pressure. (similarity 0.82)
• Outbidding is context dependent and can phase-shift toward moderation after in-group victory (similarity 0.82)
• Ethnic outbidding is intra-bloc competition that blocks inter-group compromise. (similarity 0.82)
• Aggressors with impunity lack incentive to accept peace plans (similarity 0.81)
• Outbidding impacts on peace accords form a graded spectrum from collapse to symbolic modification. (similarity 0.81)
• Threat can redirect hostility toward unrelated weaker outgroups (similarity 0.80)
• Outbidding aims range from accord collapse to full acceptance (similarity 0.80)
• Ethnic outbidding can be modulated and coexist with party modernization (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Insurgent leaders negotiating with enemies risk being accused of betrayal by their own #corroborates (0.82) — L. P. Harvey, Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614, 1033
• Outbidders weaponize fear narratives while discounting deferred peace benefits. #expands (0.80) — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 32
• Threat can redirect hostility toward unrelated weaker outgroups #complicates (0.75) — Walter G. Stephan, Oscar Ybarra, Kimberly Rios Morrison, Intergroup Threat Theory, 20
• Aggression toward out-groups is not limited to subordinate-group targets #expands (0.75)
• Aggressors with impunity lack incentive to accept peace plans #expands (0.72) — Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, 597