Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell — Blocking the Poor: Status Quo Bias in Policy Congruence

31 published claims from this book.

• Because policy change is rare, preferring the status quo yields higher congruence
• Blocking and pushing are observationally separable forms of affluent influence
• Blocking demands less coordination than achieving political change
• Coding decisions about implemented reforms distort measured policy congruence across studies
• Concern about institutional status quo bias runs through American founding debates
• Congruence and responsiveness scores cannot distinguish responsiveness to wanted change from unwanted change.
• Congruence between policy and affluent preferences cannot distinguish blocking from enacting power.
• Congruence can occur without any causal responsiveness from policymakers
• Democratic theory defines legitimate government by its responsiveness to citizen preferences
• Empirical representation research has abandoned the structural-power tradition of political theory
• Focusing on policy change hides systematic blocking of lower-income preferences
• In some countries the rich win on blocking and the poor on change
• Institutional veto points make blocking majority-supported change cheaper than passing it.
• Majority support for policy change usually fails to produce reform.
• Measuring congruence requires coding defended status quos alongside enacted reforms
• Money, time, and skills make blocking easier for high-income citizens
• Most opinion-policy questions resolve to the status quo rather than to change.
• Opinion-policy congruence is two distinct relationships lumped into one measure
• People disproportionately stick with the status quo even when change is more rational
• Policies backed by over half the public still mostly fail to pass
• Policies opposed by majorities require explanations beyond simple electoral incentives.
• Policy alignment favors high-income citizens mainly through blocking reform
• Policy congruence favors the rich only where policy rarely changes
• Policy overwhelmingly stays put even when majorities want something different.
• Political inequality is sustained more by defending existing structures than by driving change
• Political influence works mainly by preventing unwanted change, not enacting wanted change.
• Power operates by keeping grievances off the agenda entirely
• Power persists through incremental accumulated advantages rather than dramatic ruptures.
• Small policy wins compound into durable structural advantage over time
• Veto points let minorities block change and enrich the affluent
• Where reforms are feasible, wealthy citizens back change over the status quo