France believed wrongly that toppling Nasser would collapse the Algerian revolt.

Evidence

One has seen how France, from Soustelle onwards, had persuaded herself, erroneously, that Nasser and Ben Bella were the dynamos of the Algerian revolt. This had been reconfirmed during Foreign Minister Pineau’s Cairo visit of the spring, when Nasser had told him (with possibly exaggerated self-importance): “When you really have the intention of negotiating in Algeria, give me the word and it will be swiftly settled.” And the Athos had provided a last straw. Mollet and the strong man of his government, Defence Minister Bourgès-Maunoury, as well as many lesser Frenchmen convinced themselves, intuitively, that if Nasser went the collapse of the Algerian revolt would soon follow. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 493

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria; French officials mistook the revolt for isolated Cairo-directed incidents — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 299; US officials welcomed Saudi Islamicization as a Cold War counterweight to Nasser — Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of…, 390

Related

• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (similarity 0.83)
• French officers dismissed rebel sightings two days before the revolt (similarity 0.82)
• French military contempt and complacency blinded them to the coming revolt (similarity 0.82)
• French officials mistook the revolt for isolated Cairo-directed incidents (similarity 0.82)
• Francisation destroyed Algeria’s native political cadres, leaving no negotiating partners. (similarity 0.82)
• Military victory elevated the army to ultimate political arbiter in Algeria (similarity 0.82)
• French assimilation destroyed Algerian leadership cadres that could have been negotiating partners (similarity 0.82)
• Granting Tunisian and Moroccan independence without Algeria was a strategic error. (similarity 0.82)
• Soustelle predicted France would lose Algeria on the home front, not militarily. (similarity 0.81)
• OAS believed attacking French Communists would trap de Gaulle politically, but miscalculated. (similarity 0.81)
• Rapidly shifting loyalties in wartime France weakened Algerian trust in any authority (similarity 0.81)
• France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu emboldened Algerian nationalists toward revolt (similarity 0.81)
• Interior F.L.N. leaders distrusted the Cairo external delegation over arms. (similarity 0.81)
• The failed December 1960 coup irrevocably committed part of the French army to revolt (similarity 0.81)
• Military success on the battlefield coexisted with a sense that political betrayal was imminent. (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• French officials mistook the revolt for isolated Cairo-directed incidents #corroborates (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 299
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria #expands (0.55)