Negative party identity lowers democratic satisfaction except toward far-right parties

Evidence

Both in Germany and in Italy, we can mostly observe the expected significant negative relationship between NPI and democratic satisfaction, which is displayed in Fig. 1. We find substantial significant effect sizes of about − 0.5 scale points for the most disliked party in the models including the interaction between NPI and having a NPI with a populist radical right party (M1b and M2b), both in Italy and Germany. For the second/third most disliked party, NPI also relates negatively to democratic satisfaction, but the effect size is smaller and it does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in Italy. Furthermore, having a NPI towards a populist radical right party relates to greater democratic satisfaction in the models without the interaction (M1a and M2a). — Sabrina J. Mayer and Luana Russo, What one is not, 96

Categorization

• XREF: Directly feeds the We-They Engine thread on negational vs affirmative identity as a validated operationalization. — connects to: Negative party identification mobilizes voters as strongly as positive identification. — Sabrina J. Mayer and Luana Russo, What one is not: a new scale to measure…, 32; Measurements previously conflated negative party identification with affective polarization. — Sabrina J. Mayer and Luana Russo, What one is not: a new scale to measure…, 33; Negative identification against radical-right parties can raise democratic satisfaction. — Sabrina J. Mayer and Luana Russo, What one is not: a new scale to measure…, 96
• QUESTION: Why does NPI with a PRR boost democratic satisfaction in Germany but show no such moderating effect in Italy? Worth chasing the country-level explanation.

Broader Connections

• Negative identification against radical-right parties can raise democratic satisfaction. #expands (0.95) — Sabrina J. Mayer and Luana Russo, What one is not, 96