NATO officials reconceived the Soviet threat to justify continuing the alliance after its collapse

Evidence

During 1988 and 1989, NATO officials repeatedly denied that the Soviet threat had changed significantly, arguing instead that the alliance should continue past practices. Changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were noted, but military capabilities and the possibility for retrenchment were cited as reasons not to change—a combination of balance-of-threat and balance-of-power reasoning. Once the Warsaw Pact broke up and the Soviet Union dissolved, emphasis shifted toward balance-of-power concerns with more attention paid to the military potential that remained in the former Soviet Union. The threat had been transformed from being direct and deliberate to one that was indirect and perhaps unintended, but a threat nonetheless. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 86

Categorization

  • XREF: Relates to the reader’s stated interest: an institution persisting by redefining its enemy rather than dissolving when the enemy disappears. — connects to: Analysts expected NATO to die once its Soviet enemy vanished. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 12; NATO has expanded rather than dissolved after the Soviet threat ended. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 15; Alliance cohesion theories predict NATO should have dissolved after the Soviet threat vanished — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 40 (+8 more)
  • ADDENDUM: Complements the institutional-persistence theme; the threat-transformation dynamic parallels how infrastructure/trees were repurposed in the trees essay as roles evolve past original functions.

Broader Connections