Even after the Soviet threat vanished, allies fought hardest over who commands whose troops.

Evidence

Some of the most difficult fights within various working groups in NATO have been over the command arrangements needed to put in place the CJTF concept endorsed at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. American reluctance, in response to strong Congressional pressure, to have U.S. troops under “foreign command” has been a major stumbling block, as has the French insistence, reflecting long-standing domestic anxieties about American dominance in NATO’s military structure, that the greater political content of any mission arising under the CJTF framework means that Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) must of necessity play a lesser role in these types of missions, with the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s highest decisionmaking body and one in which France does have a seat) playing a greater role. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 136

Categorization

  • ADDENDUM: Supports the ‘On Sacrifice’ logic inversely transposed to ‘On Grafting & Growth’: the alliance survives by renegotiating command hierarchies rather than dissolving, a structural parallel to how living tree networks redistribute dominance.
  • XREF: connects to: NATO officials reconceived the Soviet threat to justify continuing the alliance after its collapse — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 86; Alliance cohesion theories predict NATO should have dissolved after the Soviet threat vanished — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 40; The US-China anti-Soviet alliance dissolved as Soviet threat perception eased — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 157 (+2 more)

Broader Connections