Moral reactions to suffering shift when one’s own group is the responsible party.

Evidence

The Somalia case was an example in which we witnessed the suffering of other human beings for which we held no apparent responsibility; others were perpetrating atrocities, displacing and killing people by the thousands. In other circumstances, however, it is our own group, usually our country, or our ethnic or religious group, that holds responsibility for the suffering of others. It is these contexts that are the primary focus of this analysis. I contend that while several psychological variables explain and moderate our reaction to witnessing the suffering of other human beings, these reactions are profoundly influenced by the dynamics that are specific to the collective-identity context in which they unfold. — Emanuele Castano, On the Perils of Glorifying the In-group, 16

Categorization

• XREF: Parallels the responsibility-threshold variable examined in Leidner et al.’s three-study design on glorification effects. — connects to: Group responsibility itself weakens moral control over harmful acts — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 427; Vicarious group responsibility for others’ suffering triggers shame or guilt. — Emanuele Castano, On the Perils of Glorifying the…, 63; Moral disengagement mechanisms enable justification of in-group harm. — Sonia Roccas and Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan, The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt: Modes…, 47 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• The ingroup’s own suffering suppresses guilt even when it sees itself as responsible #corroborates (0.90) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 2145
• Moral disengagement mechanisms enable justification of in-group harm. #expands (0.88) — Sonia Roccas and Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan, The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt, 47
• Vicarious group responsibility for others’ suffering triggers shame or guilt. #expands (0.85) — Emanuele Castano, On the Perils of Glorifying the In-group, 63
• Collective guilt is felt when the self’s group illegitimately harmed another group #corroborates (0.85) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 0
• Group responsibility itself weakens moral control over harmful acts #corroborates (0.82) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 427
• Attachment to the in-group and glorification predict opposite reactions to one’s group’s moral violations. #expands (0.82) — Sonia Roccas and Yechiel Klar and Ido Liviatan, The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt, 2
• Guilt can be felt for one’s group’s moral violations without personal responsibility #corroborates (0.80) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 146
• Perceived group responsibility for inequity produces collective guilt #corroborates (0.80) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 441
• Merely priming in-group membership may trigger morality principle shifts without moral content #expands (0.80) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2140
• People are capable of feeling collective guilt for their groups’ wrongs #corroborates (0.78) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 372
• Diffusion of responsibility, distortion of harm, and dehumanization each neutralize moral restraint #expands (0.78) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 62
• Salient group membership makes people treat the group’s fate as their own #expands (0.75) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 2262