Moi’s patronage politics deliberately heightened ethnic salience for regime survival

Evidence

After Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Moi came to power and ruled in a paranoid and kleptocratic manner (Barkan, 1993: 87–88; Throup, 1993: 385). Moi inherited a state in the hands of patrons that had been loyal to Kenyatta, and, as he was Kalenjin, he lacked support from a dominant ethnic group. To ensure control, Moi raised the level of state patronage transferred through individuals and made access to patronage conditional on loyalty to the executive. These strategies served to increase ethnic salience (Cheeseman, 2006: 79). — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 51

Categorization

• XREF: Authoritarian strategies of divide-and-rule by invoking ethnicity connect to classic works on ethnic salience and patronage (Bates, Lemarchand) and inform the reader’s regime-type comparison with Zambia. — connects to: Authoritarian regime stability ultimately rests on informal patronage networks brokered by ethnic elites — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 22; Patronage-based ethnic mobilization fosters zero-sum perceptions and fragmented opposition. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 58; Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75 (+1 more)

Related

• Patronage-based ethnic mobilization fosters zero-sum perceptions and fragmented opposition. (similarity 0.86)
• Authoritarian regime stability ultimately rests on informal patronage networks brokered by ethnic elites (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Patronage-based ethnic mobilization fosters zero-sum perceptions and fragmented opposition. #expands (0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 58
• Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry #contradicts (0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75
• Material privilege and status rewards cement loyalty to a violent regime #exemplifies (0.72) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 675