Military defeat of guerrilla bands shifted rather than ended the revolution’s political impact

Evidence

From the French army’s point of view, their tragedy was that at various points they could see with agonising clarity (and not without reason) that they were winning the war militarily. But (not unlike the American commanders in Vietnam) it was not given them to perceive that, at the same time, their chances of winning the war politically and on the wider world stage were growing ever slimmer. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1653 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

De Gaulle’s next change in Algeria, scheduled for early in the new year, was to replace the Commander-in-Chief, General Crépin, by General Gambiez, commander of the Oran sector. Apart from the unqestionable Gaullist fidelity shared by both, there could hardly have been a greater contrast between two men. Gambiez, at fifty-seven, was diminutive with a gentle and slightly lisping voice; bald, bespectacled and studious-looking, his face bore a constantly amiable expression that reminded one more of a country curate than a fighting general. In fact, this rather timorous and unmilitary-looking exterior belied a warrior of utmost distinction who had been one of the first to set foot on French soil in 1944, Gambiez had also lost both a son and a nephew in the hell of Indo-China. But his appearance did symbolise a major change in the conduct of the war; with the departure of Crépin, military “pacification” was to reach its end. Says de Gaulle, “The war was all but over. Military success was achieved. Operations had been reduced to next to nothing. Instead, politics dominated the scene, and in this respect the two communities were further apart than they had ever been….” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1291 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: The FLN won self-determination just when it faced military defeat; Military defeat of the rebellion coincided with its growing political entrenchment among civilians; A N.A.T.O.-style conventional army was unfit for the ambivalent task of pacification (+17 more)

Broader Connections