A militarily victorious counterinsurgency can still lose due to non-battlefield factors

Evidence

From the French army’s point of view, their tragedy was that at various points they could see with agonising clarity (and not without reason) that they were winning the war militarily. But (not unlike the American commanders in Vietnam) it was not given them to perceive that, at the same time, their chances of winning the war politically and on the wider world stage were growing ever slimmer. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1653 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Regroupment undeniably made life much more difficult for the A.L.N., but—as so often in the Algerian war—French policy found itself caught in the insoluble paradox of what was good militarily being bad politically, and vice versa. It was a pitfall into which, to some extent, the Americans were to stumble in South Vietnam. By the Battle of Algiers, Germaine Tillion concluded gloomily, “The implantation of the F.L.N. in the Algerian masses was too deep for any détente whatever to occur without the global agreement which it alone could give.” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 693 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The army’s ambiguous pacification strategy left it unsuited to counterinsurgency; French tactical victories could not win a prolonged elusive insurgency; French counterinsurgency repeatedly traded military advantage for political costs — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 693 (+20 more)

Related

• The army’s ambiguous pacification strategy left it unsuited to counterinsurgency (similarity 0.93)
• French counterinsurgency repeatedly traded military advantage for political costs (similarity 0.93)
• The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle (similarity 0.91)
• Military success on the battlefield coexisted with a sense that political betrayal was imminent. (similarity 0.89)
• The French army’s NATO-style force was ill-suited to counterinsurgency warfare. (similarity 0.89)
• Guerrilla warfare made French suppression of the insurgency fail (similarity 0.88)
• The political moment must always prevail over the military in strategy (similarity 0.87)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (similarity 0.86)
• Agounennda exposed French limits despite a tactical victory (similarity 0.86)
• Weak insurgents can win by attacking native police rather than the army (similarity 0.85)
• French troops faced guerrilla warfare that negated their conventional military advantage. (similarity 0.85)
• Challe’s countersurgency sought permanent occupation of rebel strongholds rather than one-off victories (similarity 0.84)
• The F.L.N. won its main war goal despite impending military defeat (similarity 0.84)
• Political struggle continues after military defeat on political terrain (similarity 0.84)
• French tactical victories could not win a prolonged elusive insurgency (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• The French army won militarily while losing the political and world battle #exemplifies (0.90) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1653
• French tactical victories could not win a prolonged elusive insurgency #exemplifies (0.80)
• French counterinsurgency repeatedly traded military advantage for political costs #exemplifies (0.70) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 693
• Guerrilla warfare made French suppression of the insurgency fail #qualifies (0.50)
• The army’s ambiguous pacification strategy left it unsuited to counterinsurgency #complicates (0.40)