Mafia norms function as a self-perpetuating Nash equilibrium

Evidence

Even though it ultimately prevents economic development, the mafia market has its own intrinsic tenacity. It is an equilibrium: no one has an immediate interest to behave differently and fight it even if one sees its drawbacks. Miserable and unreliable it may be, but the mafia’s protection succeeds in making a profit from distrust, thus satisfying the interests of many. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 28 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Selective initiation into the Mafia serves as an efficient behavioral guarantee; Mafia enforcement makes distrust rational and blights mutual-benefit competition; The mafia persists as a stable equilibrium that profits from distrust — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 28 (+5 more)

Related

• The mafia persists as a stable equilibrium that profits from distrust (similarity 0.92)
• Selective initiation into the Mafia serves as an efficient behavioral guarantee (similarity 0.92)
• Mafia enforcement makes distrust rational and blights mutual-benefit competition (similarity 0.82)
• Mafia protection suppresses the emergence of honest-dealing business norms. (similarity 0.82)
• Cartel equilibria are more fragile than competitive ones (similarity 0.81)
• The mafia’s subcultural system is economically a self-perpetuating equilibrium (similarity 0.81)
• The mafioso profits from deliberately injecting distrust into markets (similarity 0.81)
• A free market in quality can dissolve the demand for mafia protection (similarity 0.80)
• Mafia behavior adapts and mutates yet never transforms at its core. (similarity 0.80)
• Mafia behavior is rational once considered as a protection-selling industry under competitive pressure (similarity 0.79)
• The mafioso profits directly from maintained distrust in the market. (similarity 0.79)
• Private enforcement can perversely suppress self-policing among market participants. (similarity 0.79)
• The mafia converts distrust into profit by enforcing resource monopolies (similarity 0.78)
• Mafia protection makes collusion more likely, elaborate, and enduring (similarity 0.78)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• The mafia persists as a stable equilibrium that profits from distrust #corroborates (1.00) — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 28
• The mafia persists in a turbulent equilibrium without monopoly or dissolution #expands (0.78)
• Mafia enforcement makes distrust rational and blights mutual-benefit competition #contradicts (0.75)
• Adversaries in indeterminate games mutually construct the norms that govern their conflict #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 379
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 669