Selective initiation into the Mafia serves as an efficient behavioral guarantee

Evidence

Even though it ultimately prevents economic development, the mafia market has its own intrinsic tenacity. It is an equilibrium: no one has an immediate interest to behave differently and fight it even if one sees its drawbacks. Miserable and unreliable it may be, but the mafia’s protection succeeds in making a profit from distrust, thus satisfying the interests of many. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 28 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Mafia norms function as a self-perpetuating Nash equilibrium; Entry into the mafia requires inherited skills or psychopathy plus no better options; The mafia persists as a stable equilibrium that profits from distrust — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 28 (+4 more)

Related

• Mafia norms function as a self-perpetuating Nash equilibrium (similarity 0.92)
• The mafia persists as a stable equilibrium that profits from distrust (similarity 0.91)
• A free market in quality can dissolve the demand for mafia protection (similarity 0.83)
• Mafia behavior is rational once considered as a protection-selling industry under competitive pressure (similarity 0.83)
• Mafia protection suppresses the emergence of honest-dealing business norms. (similarity 0.83)
• Mafia behavior adapts and mutates yet never transforms at its core. (similarity 0.83)
• The mafioso profits directly from maintained distrust in the market. (similarity 0.81)
• The mafia’s subcultural system is economically a self-perpetuating equilibrium (similarity 0.81)
• Mafia protection requires maintaining relations with the underworld it polices (similarity 0.81)
• The mafioso profits from deliberately injecting distrust into markets (similarity 0.81)
• Mafia enforcement is selective and excludes protection of begging or prostitution. (similarity 0.80)
• Mafia protection forecloses the reputational norms that honest trade normally evolves (similarity 0.80)
• Mafia violence exceeds what rational enforcement economics would require (similarity 0.80)
• Mafia recruitment requires insider training or psychopathic disposition plus no better options (similarity 0.80)
• Mafia services arise where unstable transactions lack state enforcement (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Mafia norms function as a self-perpetuating Nash equilibrium #expands (0.82)
• Entry into the mafia requires inherited skills or psychopathy plus no better options #expands (0.80)
• The mafia persists as a stable equilibrium that profits from distrust #corroborates (0.75) — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 28