Judgesâ attitudes and institutional context, not law, drive their rulings.
Evidence
The second approach, which I shall call the political perspective, insists that judicial decision making closely resembles decision making by other political actors. According to this view, extralegal factors are decisive in judicial decision making: the attitudes of the judges, their conceptions of how they should behave, and the institutional context in which they operate. Although judges must justify their rulings on the basis of law, law merely provides the justification for judicial decisions; it does not altogether constrain judicial choice. â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 2438
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines the âpolitical perspectiveâ on judicial decision making, one of the two central frameworks the chapter contrasts with the legal perspective.
- XREF: Connects to attitudinal and strategic models of judicial behavior and to legal realist critiques of formalism. â connects to: Even segregationist judges reluctantly followed Supreme Court rulings on property â Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making ofâŠ, 167; Institutional dependency lets judges routinize program use beyond eligibility rules. â Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas ofâŠ, 196; Judgesâ scheduling self-interest can license weaker objections to survive. â , Harr Jonathan - A Civil Action , 1742 (+17 more)
Broader Connections
- Pragmatic law judges rules by their consequences, not their origins.
#corroborates(1.00) â Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 38 - The political perspective holds that judgesâ attitudes determine their rulings.
#corroborates(1.00) â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 2647 - Judicial rulings have policy consequences yet judges should not impose their own policy views
#complicates(1.00) â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 2688 - Judgesâ personal attitudes systematically shape their case votes.
#corroborates(1.00) â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 2579 - Judicial decisions result from attitudes, role conceptions, and institutional constraints interacting together.
#corroborates(1.00) â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 1286 - Judgesâ politics, gender, and family shape their rulings empirically
#corroborates(1.00) - Judges expand or narrow precedent by reasoning analogically, not mechanically.
#qualifies(1.00) â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 1278 - Judges rely on personal values when competing legal principles are evenly balanced
#corroborates(1.00) â Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to ClearâŠ, 156 - Variation in judgesâ role conceptions, not state law, explains divergent school finance rulings.
#corroborates(1.00) â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 3302 - Judgesâ attitudes cannot be reliably inferred from opinion rhetoric
#complicates(1.00) â Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 120 - Judgesâ personal attributes and even trivial bodily states can shape decisions
#corroborates(1.00) - Regional political culture shapes the attitudes judges bring to the bench
#qualifies(0.85) â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 2576 - Judges create the rules they apply rather than applying preexisting rules.
#complicates(0.85) â G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and JudicialâŠ, 2526 - Formal judges strengthen reputation systems rather than replace them.
#complicates(0.75) â PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OFâŠ, 14 - Judges may not comment on government policy or law merits.
#complicates(0.75) â Lynley Hood, A City Possessed, 3260