Justices who favor an outcome personally may still suppress those views on role-conception grounds.

Evidence

“One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not likely to be insensitive to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant, I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in the Court’s opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic… . As a member of this Court, I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard.” — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1288

Categorization

• XREF: Frankfurter’s self-limiting restraint echoes the ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ vs. role-conception discussion and Cardinale/ch25 due-process debate on procedural versus substantive judging. — connects to: Sitting justices rarely change views, so screening nominees works — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 540; Judicial rulings have policy consequences yet judges should not impose their own policy views — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2688; Partisan views do not directly determine state supreme court school finance rulings. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 3304 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Judicial rulings have policy consequences yet judges should not impose their own policy views #expands (0.95) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2688
• Judicial decisions result from attitudes, role conceptions, and institutional constraints interacting together. #corroborates (0.92) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1286
• Partisan views do not directly determine state supreme court school finance rulings. #exemplifies (0.78) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 3304