Judges are layered products of legal, judicial, national-bench, and period-style conditioning.

Evidence

If on the other hand you are aware of the fact of movement, then to ignore the law of leeways is to ignore the fact that judges are not simply people. People they are, and people they remain, but they are people who have been conditioned first as lawyers, dho therefore see things and classify things and weigh things like lawyers; and they are also people who have been conditioned second as judges, which makes them very different from what they were when they were merely lawyers; and they are also people who have been conditioned by the tradition of the American bench, and of a particular American bench, which marks them off sharply from French or British or Canadian judges; and they are, finally, people who have been conditioned by the period-style (or styles) of work in law which has had general prevalence during their earlier and later formative years. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 2304

Categorization

  • XREF: Exemplifies the observation/conditioning-as-method thread and deepens the earlier volume’s point that courts are constrained by their office. — connects to: Common-law doctrine’s pre-industrial concepts need reformulation for the industrial corporation. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 2325; Judges’ personal attributes and even trivial bodily states can shape decisions; Judges’ politics, gender, and family shape their rulings empirically (+3 more)

Broader Connections