I further believed that journalists, and citizens generally, could make use of these forms of legal argument, although they were not confined to legal argument in making constitutional decisions as were government officials. The constitutional discourse of which the people were an essential part could be enriched by legal argument, and judicial decisions need not be either ignored or passively accepted.
Evidence
The available forms of argument are different for those deciders who are confined to legal argument-like government officials sometimes are-and those who are not. Sometimes, as in the confirmation example, the forms of legal argument (here, the text) will direct the decider to enlarge her list. And sometimes those deciders who are not so limited-the People, for example-will wish to consult the specifically legal forms, as I shall discuss below. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 496 (
#expands, via linked claim)
Second, they conflate constitutional argument (an activity confined to those persons whose decisions must be explained in terms of legal argument) with constitutional discourse (an activity that takes up the same subjects, and which may include legal argument, but which, though constrained by its own modalities of argument, is not confined to legal argument). — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 409 (
#expands, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: That these borders may be disputed-that there is, in Balkin and Levinson’s term, no ‘consensus’-rather proves my point. For there would be no reason for radicals to dispute the inclusiveness of legal argument if in fact all were permitted.; Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 496; Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 409
Related
- Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries. (similarity 0.90)
- Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. (similarity 0.90)
- Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not… (similarity 0.89)
- Constitutional interpretation and constitutional discourse are distinct practices. (similarity 0.86)
- For me, the use of the six forms of constitutional argument is the way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six forms maintains the legitimacy of… (similarity 0.85)
- Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval (similarity 0.83)
- A constitutional grammar lets nonjudicial actors reason legally about constitutional questions. (similarity 0.81)
- and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.81)
- Opinion arguments rationalize decisions rather than explain how they are reached. (similarity 0.79)
- US constitutional argument forms derive from common-law modes overlaid on the state. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms.
#expands(0.80) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 496 - That these borders may be disputed-that there is, in Balkin and Levinson’s term, no ‘consensus’-rather proves my point. For there would be no reason for radicals to dispute the inclusiveness of…
#corroborates(0.75) - Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries.
#expands(0.70) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 409