Group behavior arises from depersonalized self-representation as interchangeable category exemplars

Evidence

The basic tenet of these theories is that group behaviors derive from cognitive representations of the self in terms of its membership in a shared social category in which there is effectively no psychological separation between the self and the group as a whole. This phenomenon is known as the depersonalization of self-representation. When social identity is made salient, individuals “come to perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). Thus, the cognitive representation of the self shifts from the personal self to the collective self (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1607

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines depersonalization of self-representation precisely as the mechanism assumed at the base of social identity theory.
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1607
• XREF: connects to: Common fate shifts self-categorisation from individuals to a group — John Drury, The role of social identity processes…, 49; Group isolation filters perception and enables depersonalizing outsiders. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 4148; Salient self-categories make people perceive themselves as interchangeable group exemplars. — Nurit Shnabel and Johannes Ullrich, Identity Needs in Intergroup Relations:…, 53 (+2 more)