The social self splits into individual, relational, and collective forms, not one continuum

Evidence

Parallel to the constructs of individualism and collectivism, social identity theory is often thought of as a continuum with personal (individuated) identity on one end, and social (collective) identity at the other. The shift between personal and social identities is presumed to lay in universal cognitive processes associated with social categorization and category salience. Against this view of a single continuum, however, Brewer and Gardner (1996) suggested that there may be three qualitatively different views of the “social self”: individual, relational, and collective, each being a distinct self-representation with different structural properties, basis for self-evaluation, and motivational concerns (see also Chen, Zhao, & Lee, this volume; Gabriel & Gardner, 1999; Kashima & Hardie, 2000). The individual self is the representation of self as a unique person, differentiated from other individuals, while the relational self is defined in terms of connections and role relationships with significant others (Cross & Madson, 1997; Gilligan, 1982). The relational self is personalized and incorporates dyadic relationships between the self, specific close others, and networks of such interpersonal connections. On the contrary, the collective self is consistent with the social identity of self-categorization theory (SCT), defined in terms of prototypical properties shared among members of a common in-group (Brewer, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). It consists of depersonalized connections with others by virtue of common membership in a symbolic group. Unlike relational identities, collective identities do not require interpersonal relationship knowledge or coordination but instead rely on shared symbols and cognitive representations of the group as a unit. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1613

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes individual vs. relational vs. collective self-representations, each with distinct structural properties, evaluation bases, and motivational concerns.
• XREF: Connects to self-categorization theory (Turner et al.) and Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness — the relational/collective split challenges classic SCT assumptions. — connects to: The single authentic self is a social construction at odds with real social practice. — Alice E. Marwick, Status Update: Celebrity, Publicity,…, 617; Social status, not individual choice, determines most of any persona — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for…, 283; A social movement is defined by three-way interactions, not solo action. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 338 (+1 more)