Salient group membership replaces personal identity with a collective self

Evidence

Multiple-categorization approaches are receiving ever more attention in social psychological theory and research on intergroup relations. The basic premise underlying such approaches is that individuals typically belong to and identify with multiple social groups. Moreover, these approaches underline the notion that multiple social categories can become salient simultaneously, affording individuals the capacity to attend to and make judgments about others based on their multiple group memberships. This is, of course, not a new idea. Social psychologists have long recognized the importance of multiple categorization processes for understanding intergroup relations (see Crisp & Hewstone, 2007, for a detailed review), as have scholars in other fields (e.g., Murphy, 1957). What is new, however, is the notion advanced by Marilynn Brewer and colleagues that individuals differ in the way in which they incorporate their multiple group memberships into their sense of self. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 514 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Across two studies, participants that had both their ingroup and outgroup made salient more strongly identified themselves as a member of their ingroup than did participants who only had their ingroup (Studies 1 & 2) or outgroup (Study 2) made salient. Thus, even with subliminal influences, these two factors in combination produced the greatest shift in participants’ social identification with their own group. This is quite different from other research examining subtle influences on the self (e.g., DeMarree et al., 2005; Gardner et al., 1999) which typically has shown that the mere activation of relevant concepts can produce assimilative shifts in self-views, and speaks to the relative uniqueness of social identity more broadly. Therefore, the present findings, that individuals’ conscious sense of connection or identification with an ingroup can be influenced by sources outside of awareness, are consistent with the growing body of research indicating that seemingly complex processes can occur nonconsciously (for a review, see Andersen, Moskowitz, Blair, & Nosek, 2007). — Brandon Randolph-Seng, Darcy A. Reich, and Kenneth G. DeMarree, On the Nonconscious Antecedents of…, 50 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
• XREF: connects to: Shared identity generates expectations of support and trust among group members — John Drury, The role of social identity processes…, 16; Common fate shifts self-categorisation from individuals to a group — John Drury, The role of social identity processes…, 49; Self-categorization at group level makes members feel ingroup wrongdoings as their own. — Michael T. Schmitt, Daniel A. Miller, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Jack W. Brehm, The Difficulty of Making Reparations…, 14 (+14 more)

Broader Connections

• People differ in how they integrate their multiple group memberships into self-identity. #complicates (0.75) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 514
• Ingroup-outgroup pairing, not either alone, drives identity shifts #complicates (0.72) — Brandon Randolph-Seng, Darcy A. Reich, and Kenneth G. DeMarree, On the Nonconscious Antecedents of…, 50