France’s effective suppression of opposition guaranteed it would later be surprised by resistance.

Evidence

It was a profound and far-sighted analysis. When France, in extremis between 1954 and 1962, was to cast around for interlocuteurs valables, moderate nationalist representatives with whom compromise solutions might be negotiated, among this “human dust” she was to find virtually none. On the other hand, from earliest days the colonial structure had so functioned as to impede and obviate the emergence of any concerted Muslim opposition body, and for long years it succeeded marvellously; yet again, when the ultimate disaster did occur, France would be taken by surprise, because — for the reasons suggested by Cambon — the resistance movements would be “unknown”. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 107

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Muslim observers saw French lassitude as the source of imminent victory; French military contempt and complacency blinded them to the coming revolt; France’s race policy aimed to dissolve chiefly resistance centers and win loyalty

Broader Connections