Heavy-handed military reprisals in Algeria drove more Algerians to join the rebels.

Evidence

Quickly he realised both that poverty was far more dire and that the revolt was far more serious than metropolitan France yet appreciated. “Terror had taken hold. No one spoke,” he wrote later. “The population as a whole, without throwing in its lot with the rebels … remained frightened and noncommittal.” He also saw the futility of General Cherrière’s grandiose and elephantine ratissages, the ill-named Operations “Véronique” and “Violette” that were then under way, and agreed with the analysis Vaujour prepared for him on his return to Algiers: “To send in tank units, to destroy villages, to bombard certain zones, this is no longer the fine comb; it is using a sledgehammer to kill fleas. And what is much more serious, it is to encourage the young — and sometimes the less young — to go into the maquis.” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 342

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the counterproductive-repression theme from the Spanish Armada chapter and other colonial histories. — connects to: France regrouped a million Algerians to sever the army from the people — Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, 99; By late 1956 both France’s military and diplomatic options in Algeria had failed; Regroupment camps won militarily but drove Algerians into F.L.N. ranks (+8 more)

Broader Connections