Frameworks for economic change should be judged by theoretical usefulness, not absolute truth.

Evidence

In this sense, I have argued that perspectives on economic change, such as postindustrialism and financialization (others could readily be added to the list),have to be justified notin terms of some absolute truth they reveal about the world but in terms of their usefulness with respect to specific theoretical problems.Different ways of‘seeing’ the salient shifts that constitute long-term change in the economy produce new questions for investigation, and can potentially help to resolve impasses in areas of ongoing research. — Greta R. Krippner, The Financialization of the American…, 129

Categorization

  • DEEPTHINKING: This is a genuinely epistemologically rich methodological stance — frameworks as instruments for particular theoretical problems rather than competing descriptions of reality — striking for an empirical economics paper and worth sitting with.
  • XREF: Connects to the reader’s work on grand historical frameworks and how narrative infrastructure shapes what we can see — a pragmatic, tool-like theory of historical categories. — connects to: Friedman judged hypotheses solely by predictive capacity, not by realism of assumptions — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free…, 405; Friedman held that important theories must rest on descriptively false assumptions — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial…, 54; Economic theories function as analytic engines rather than exact copies of reality. (+6 more)

Broader Connections