Using trust does not deplete it, so trust can build on trust

Evidence

It is argued by some that trust is similarly a resource—indeed, that it is a matter of “social capital.” However, as I argue in chapter 3, trust is not a kind of resource and is therefore not a candidate for social capital. Rather, if there is social capital involved in trust, it is the capital of rich relationships that ground trustworthiness and enable trust and therefore cooperation. Trust is not, as altruism may be, a motivation that we must use sparingly because we have limited amounts of it. It is a cognitive judgment that depends on perceived facts. It may or may not be in short supply, but using it—that is to say, acting on it—does not reduce the supply. In some contexts people can trust one another across broad ranges of issues. Indeed, establishing trust in one area might lead to expanding it to other areas by generating diversified or higher levels of trustworthiness. Hence trust can build on trust. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 516

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly contradicts the reader’s integration aim: where Saramago’s Blindness shows trust collapsing because observation vanishes, Hardin insists trust is a cognitive judgment fed by perceived facts — the wife’s sightedness is precisely what lets her sustain perceived facts, so the two texts converge on observability as trust’s substrate. — connects to: Trust is not a resource depleted by use; Extending trust can create the trustworthy behavior it presumes; Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781 (+2 more)
  • DEFINE: Defines trust as a cognitive judgment dependent on perceived facts, and by exclusion defines what could count as social capital — rich relationships that ground trustworthiness.
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 516

Broader Connections