Earned entitlements and game framing change how much people share.

Evidence

This interpretation of dictators’ reasoning in standard versions of the game is confirmed by some of the first experiments on participants’ sense of entitlement, done by Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) and Hoffman et al. (1996). Hoffman and colleagues observe that when individuals must compete to earn the role of dictator, they give less to the recipient than they do in a control condition where they become dictator by, for example, the flipping of a coin. … Participants use the name of the game to decide whether the money involved in the game belongs to them or is shared with the other participants. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 127

Categorization

  • XREF: Links to the reader’s Big God/partner-choice framework: the fumi-e trampling is itself a reframing device that erases entitlement and moral obligation. — connects to: Fairness in economic games tracks perceived entitlement rather than raw contribution. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 467; Talented individuals merit larger shares because their outside options are stronger. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 50; People accept large inequalities they judge as earned or deserved. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 712 (+3 more)
  • QUESTION: Does the osotua framing ā€˜long-term mutual help’ reduce sharing because it’s framed as reciprocal rather than one-shot, or because of cultural ownership norms?

Broader Connections