Donor-specific image scoring sustains cooperation while self-only strategies fail

Evidence

Another interesting expansion of the basic model is to include strategies that consider both the recipient’s and the donor’s image score. We explored two types of strategies. ‘And’ strategies involve cooperation if the image score of the recipient is larger than a certain value and the image score of the donor is less than a certain value. The idea is that if an individual has already a high image score, it is not necessary to aim for a still higher image score (by helping others). On the other hand, ‘or’strategies result in cooperation if the image score of the recipient is larger than a certain value or the image score of the donor is less than a certain value. Here the idea is that if an individual has a low image score it may be advantageous to increase the score by helping others regardless of how low their image score is. In both cases, highly cooperative societies form (Fig 4). If, in contrast, we simulate strategies that only consider their own image and do not take into account the image of the recipient, cooperation does not emerge. — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 73

Categorization

• XREF: Mirrors the Scarlet Letter reading purpose: Hester’s fixed ‘A’ is scored by observers, while Dimmesdale’s unobserved transgression is invisible to the image-scoring system - here the model shows that basing cooperation on donor reputation in addition to recipient reputation changes emergent cooperation. — connects to: An image score updates only when one acts as donor, not as recipient. — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 36; In image-scoring simulations cooperation wins when interaction frequency per generation is high. — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 38; Cooperation in image-scoring populations requires only about two interactions per player per lifetime. — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 68 (+9 more)

Related

• In image-scoring simulations cooperation wins when interaction frequency per generation is high. (similarity 0.89)
• Cooperation in image-scoring populations requires only about two interactions per player per lifetime. (similarity 0.88)
• An image score updates only when one acts as donor, not as recipient. (similarity 0.85)
• Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K — Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring (similarity 0.82)
• A two-level analytical image-scoring model can be solved rather than simulated (similarity 0.80)
• Unconditional cooperators must be modeled separately from image-scoring discriminators. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Visible honesty signals are what keep cooperation stable in populations #corroborates (0.80)
• A two-level analytical image-scoring model can be solved rather than simulated #expands (0.80) — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 74
• Pervasive distrust is stable because solo cooperation invites exploitation #corroborates (0.78)
• Human pattern-seeking is designed for cooperation, not for randomness #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 742
• Egoistic micro-motivation lacks momentum across cases of cooperation #corroborates (0.75)
• Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions. #contradicts (0.72)
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #qualifies (0.72) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781
• Initial cooperation can wreck backward induction and build rational trust #complicates (0.72) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 606