In image-scoring simulations cooperation wins when interaction frequency per generation is high.

Evidence

Figure 1 shows computer simulations of a population consisting of n players. The strategies are given by ki and the image levels by si. At the beginning of each generation, the image levels of all players are zero (assuming that children do not inherit the image of their parents). In succession, m donor–recipient pairs are chosen. A donor, i, cooperates with a recipient, j, if ki # sj. The fitness of a player is given by the total number of points received during the m interactions. Some players may never be chosen, in which case their payoff from the game will be zero. On average, a player will be chosen 2m/n times, either as donor or as recipient. At the end of each generation, players leave offspring in proportion to the their fitness. We find that if the game is played for many generations, then eventually all players will adopt the same strategy. If the k value of this strategy is 0 or less then cooperation is established; if the value is 1 or more then defection has won. Cooperation is more likely to win if the number of interactions, m, per generation is large. — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 38

Categorization

• XREF: Supports the reader’s Nowak-Sigmund framing: dense repeated interaction is what lets a visible reputation system sustain cooperation. — connects to: Donor-specific image scoring sustains cooperation while self-only strategies fail — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 73; Cooperation in image-scoring populations requires only about two interactions per player per lifetime. — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 68; Visible honesty signals are what keep cooperation stable in populations (+2 more)

Related

• Cooperation in image-scoring populations requires only about two interactions per player per lifetime. (similarity 0.91)
• Donor-specific image scoring sustains cooperation while self-only strategies fail (similarity 0.89)
• Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K — Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring (similarity 0.82)
• A two-level analytical image-scoring model can be solved rather than simulated (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Donor-specific image scoring sustains cooperation while self-only strategies fail #corroborates (0.85) — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 73
• Cooperation in image-scoring populations requires only about two interactions per player per lifetime. #expands (0.75) — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 68
• Visible honesty signals are what keep cooperation stable in populations #responds-to (0.70)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. #expands (0.70)
• Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions. #complicates (0.70)