Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K β Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring
10 published claims from this book.
- A two-level analytical image-scoring model can be solved rather than simulated
- An image score updates only when one acts as donor, not as recipient.
- Cooperation in image-scoring populations requires only about two interactions per player per lifetime.
- Discriminator strategies base aid on recipientsβ most recent recorded move.
- Donor-specific image scoring sustains cooperation while self-only strategies fail
- Human ultrasociality rests on cultural moral systems and reciprocity rather than kin selection.
- In image-scoring simulations cooperation wins when interaction frequency per generation is high.
- Larger groups make cooperation harder to establish because reputational information spreads more thinly.
- Prefrontal cortex neurons selectively represent only task-relevant information
- Unconditional cooperators must be modeled separately from image-scoring discriminators.