Democratic allegiance is secured through practices of persuasion, not arguments for universal validity

Evidence

Approaching democratic action from a Wittgensteinian point of view can therefore help us to pose the question of allegiancc to democracy in a different way. Indeed, we arc led to acknowledge that democracy does not require a theory of truth and notions like unconditionality and universal validity but a manifold of practices and pragmatic moves aiming at persuading people to broaden the range of their commitments to others, to build a more inclusive community. Such a shift in perspective reveals that, by putting an exclusive emphasis on the arguments needed to secure the IqjtimllCY of liberal institutions, recent moral and political theorists have been asking the wrong question. The real issue is not to find arguments to justify the rationality or universality of liberal democracy that would be acceptable by every rational or reasonable person. Liberal democratic principles can only be defended as being constitutive of our form of life, and we should not try to ground our commitment to them on something supposedly safer. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 302

Categorization

• DEFINE: Sets up the shift from legitimacy-seeking to allegiance-through-practices as the core of Mouffe’s democratic politics contrast.
• XREF: The ‘form of life’ grounding plugs directly into the reader’s agonistic-pluralism test: if belonging is a form of life, exclusion may be constitutive rather than contingent. — connects to: Allegiance to democratic institutions rests on practices forming citizens, not rational justification — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 432; Passions and affects, not rationality, secure allegiance to democratic values — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 433; Deliberative politics is constitutive of democracy, not a regulative ideal — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 54 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• Allegiance to democratic institutions rests on practices forming citizens, not rational justification #expands (0.95) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 432
• Passions and affects, not rationality, secure allegiance to democratic values #qualifies (0.85) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 433
• Persuasion succeeds only when both parties share underlying moral commitments #qualifies (0.84)
• Working democratic procedures require an underlying democratic ethos rather than standing alone #corroborates (0.82) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 315
• Common allegiance to pluralist democratic principles is necessarily a conflictual consensus #expands (0.80) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 464
• Deliberative democracy grounds legitimacy in presumed impartiality toward all #complicates (0.76) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 399
• Not every disagreement requires convincing the other side to achieve value #expands (0.74) — Holm Gero Hümmler, Ulrike Schiesser, Fact and Prejudice, 39
• Deliberative politics is constitutive of democracy, not a regulative ideal #complicates (0.72) — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 54