Deliberative theorists seek rational consensus, not mere compromise or modus vivendi

Evidence

In such a view it is not enough for a democratic procedure to take account of the interests of all and to reach a compromise that will establish a modus vivendi. The aim is to generate ‘communicative power’ and this requires establishing the conditions for a freely given assent of all concerned, hence the importance of finding procedures that would guarantee moral impartiality. Only then can one be sure that the consensus that is obtained is a rational one and not a mere agreement. This is why the accent is put on the nature of the deliberative procedure and on the types of reasons that are deemed acceptable for compctent participants. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 401

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Distinguishes rational consensus from modus vivendi; Mouffe will argue this demand for rational consensus is the heart of the democratic paradox.
  • XREF: Mouffe’s whole project opposes this consensus-seeking; links to Schmitt’s critique she draws on. — connects to: Deliberative consensus theories wrongly deny pluralism’s constitutive conflict — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 469; Deliberative democrats ground legitimacy in rational consensus produced by ideal discourse procedures — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 219; Deliberative democracy is agonal dissent atop constitutional consensus, not consensus-seeking talk. — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 19 (+5 more)

Broader Connections