Deliberative politics is constitutive of democracy, not a regulative ideal

Evidence

Democratic elections cease to function properly, for example, when the failure to take seriously the interests of underprivileged non-voters leads to a vicious circle, or when the infrastructures of public communication disintegrate to such an extent that numbing resentment gains the upper hand over well-informed public opinions. In short, I do not see deliberative politics as an aloof ideal against which sordid reality must be measured, but as an existential presupposition of any democracy worthy of the name. — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 54

Categorization

  • XREF: Turns the ā€˜deliberative standards as regulative ideals’ framing from the interviewer’s question on its head — a direct second-generation counterpoint to both Foucault-style and Adornian skepticism. — connects to: Deliberative democracy is agonal dissent atop constitutional consensus, not consensus-seeking talk. — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 19; Democratic elections legitimize only as outcomes of prior public deliberation, not preference aggregation — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 94; Power-legitimation must come from within democracy itself once unifying worldviews fade — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 92 (+7 more)

Broader Connections