Deliberative democracy eliminates pluralism to achieve consensus, leaving it unable to answer Schmitt

Evidence

Because it posrulates the availability of a consensus without exclusion, the model of deliberative democracy is unable to envisage liberal-democratic pluralism in an adequate way. Indeed, one could indicate how, in both Rawls and Habermas - to take the best-known representatives of that trend - the very condition for the creation of consensus is the elimination of pluralism from the public sphere. 17 Hence the incapacity of deliberative democracy to provide a convincing refutation of Schmitt’s critique of liberal pluralism. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 225

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Rawls’s well-ordered society erases the adversary from democratic politics. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 69; Schmitt’s homogeneity requirement targets liberal interest-group pluralism, which he rightly faults — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 230; The moral consensus itself can silence those excluded from the start — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 351 (+16 more)

Broader Connections

• Deliberative democracy is agonal dissent atop constitutional consensus, not consensus-seeking talk. #contradicts (0.90) — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 19
• Democratic negotiation is agonistic struggle without final resolution #contradicts (0.85)
• Ethical approaches to pluralism omit the limits and hegemonic violence consensus requires #qualifies (0.80) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 581
• Pluralism inside the demos contradicts the homogeneity democracy requires #complicates (0.75) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 234
• Discussion defined parliamentarism for Schmitt, not majority rule alone #contradicts (0.75) — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, 452
• Kirchheimer rejected Schmitt’s claim that democracy requires homogeneity #corroborates (0.75) — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 961