The moral consensus itself can silence those excluded from the start
Evidence
But, asks Cavell, ‘what if there is a cry of justice that expresses a sense not of having lost out in an unequal yet fair struggle, but of having from the start been left out’, Giving as example the situation of Nora in Ibsen’s play A Doll’s House, he shows how deprivation of a voice in the conversation of justice can be the work of the moral consensus itself. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 351
Categorization
- SEED: The Nora example exposes consensus as a form of exclusion-as-birthright — a wedge for critiquing the ‘we’ of any consensus.
- recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
- XREF: connects to: Deliberative democracy eliminates pluralism to achieve consensus, leaving it unable to answer Schmitt — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 225; Rawls’s well-ordered society eliminates politics and requires coercion of dissenters — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 129; Every consensus is a provisional hegemonic stabilization entailing exclusion. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 467 (+2 more)